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Article 3

Passive-Voice References in Statutory
Interpretation
*

Anita S. Krishnakumar†
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court regularly references grammar rules
when interpreting statutory language. And yet grammar
references play a peculiar role in the Court’s statutory cases—
often lurking in the background and performing corroborative
work to support a construction arrived at primarily through
other interpretive tools. The inevitable legisprudential1
question triggered by such references is, why does the Court
bother? If grammar rules provide merely a second, third, or
fourth justification for an interpretation reached through other
interpretive canons, then what does the Court gain—or think it
gains—by including such rules in its statutory analysis?
This essay examines these questions through the lens of
a little-noticed grammar reference that has reared its head in a
handful of Supreme Court cases: inferences based on a
statute’s use of the passive voice. The essay argues that the
Supreme Court’s framing of passive-voice arguments suggests
both legitimating and harmonizing roles for grammar
references in statutory interpretation. Larry Solan has argued
that judges employ linguistic analysis in statutory
interpretation because they are under pressure to write
decisively and to limit what they say to certain acceptable
argument forms.2 Linguistic arguments, Solan theorizes, lend a
(false) sense of neutrality and inevitability to a court’s
*

© 2011 Anita S. Krishnakumar. All rights reserved.
Associate Professor, St. John’s University School of Law. J.D., Yale Law
School, 1999; A.B., with distinction, Stanford University, 1996.
1
The term “legisprudence” refers to “the jurisprudence of legislation,” as
described by Bill Eskridge. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA
L. REV. 621, 624 (1990); John L. Flynn, Mixed-Motive Causation Under the ADA: Linked
Statutes, Fuzzy Thinking, and Clear Statements, 83 GEO. L.J. 2009, 2012 (1995); Abbe R.
Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus
and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1762 n.32 (2010).
2
LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 9, 174 (1993).
†
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statutory reading—making it seem as if the court had no choice
but to construe the statute in the selected manner.3 The Court’s
passive-voice-based linguistic arguments provide some support
for Solan’s theory. But I submit that there is more to the
Court’s articulation of passive-voice-based interpretive
inferences than the legitimation of its statutory constructions.
This essay argues that the Court also uses passive-voice
references to promote horizontal coherence across the United
States Code. That is, when the Court announces particular
interpretive inferences that flow from a statute’s use of the
passive voice and other grammar devices, it not only justifies
its interpretation of the statute at issue but also constructs
consistency of meaning across federal statutes.
Elsewhere, I have posited that several members of the
Court are motivated by a methodological preference for
ensuring coherence across the legal landscape when construing
statutes.4 In line with this preference, when the Court derives
specific consequences from a statute’s grammatical choices, it
does not merely apply well-worn rules to the statute at hand; it
also engages in a subtle project of constructing coherence
across the legal landscape⎯creating, in effect, a judicially
prescribed federal code of grammatical meaning.
I.

THE PASSIVE-VOICE CASES

To date, six Supreme Court cases, decided between 1977
and 2009, have referenced a statute’s use of the passive voice to
determine the statute’s meaning.5 Most of these cases have
involved criminal statutes,6 and four have referenced the
passive voice only to observe that it leaves the statute’s
meaning indeterminate.7 Opinions in two of the cases have read
3

Id. at 4, 45.
See generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts
Court’s First Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221 (2010).
5
See Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1853 (2009); Watson v. United
States, 552 U.S. 74, 81 (2007); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 259 (1999)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 332-33 (1992); id. at
341, 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,
102-03 (1979); E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 128-29 (1977).
6
See Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1853; Watson, 552 U.S. at 81; Jones, 526 U.S. at
259 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Wilson, 503 U.S. at 332-33; id. at 341, 343 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
7
See Watson, 552 U.S. at 81; Wilson, 503 U.S. at 332-33; id. at 341, 343
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 102-03; E. I. du Pont de
Nemours, 430 U.S. at 128-29.
4
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something significant into Congress’s decision to employ the
passive voice in a statutory phrase.8 This part reviews all six
cases, focusing on the latter two in which the Court placed
noteworthy weight on a statute’s use of the passive voice.
A.

The Passive Voice as Indeterminate

There is nothing remarkable about the Court’s passivevoice references in the first four cases. In each case, the Court
merely acknowledged that the passive voice obscured the
identity of the statutory actor who was authorized or deemed to
take the action described in the provision. In Watson v. United
States, for example, the Court noted that the statute’s use of
the passive voice made it unclear whether a person who trades
drugs for a gun “uses” a gun within the meaning of the statute.9
The passive voice played a similar role in Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, where the Court held that because Title
VIII used the passive voice in authorizing civil actions for
violations of the statute, the statute placed “no particular
statutory restrictions on potential plaintiffs” entitled to bring
enforcement suits.10 Likewise, in E. I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. v. Train, the Court found that a section of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, which used the passive voice in
describing effluent limitations, was unclear as to whether the
administrator or the permit issuer⎯that is, which actor⎯was
supposed to establish the limitations.11 Last, in United States v.
Wilson, both the majority and dissenting opinions observed
that a Sentencing Reform Act provision written in the passive
voice “created doubt”12 and “failed to identify” which decision
maker⎯the attorney general or the judge⎯was to effectuate
the sentencing credit in the provision.13
8

See Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1853; Jones, 526 U.S. at 259 (Kennedy, J.,

dissenting).
9

Watson, 552 U.S. at 81. The statute at issue provided a mandatory minimum
sentence for a defendant “who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime . . . , uses or caries a firearm.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006).
10
Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 103.
11
E. I. du Pont de Nemours, 430 U.S. at 128-29. Based on the language in the
statute’s other sections, the Court ultimately concluded that it was the administrator
who was to do so, but it declared the section written in the passive voice indeterminate
on this question. Id.
12
Wilson, 503 U.S. at 332.
13
Id. at 341-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority and dissent both
concluded, based on other considerations, that one actor should nevertheless be
preferred over the other. Id. at 333 (majority opinion); id. at 343 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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Each of these passive-voice references comports with
traditional grammatical understandings of the passive voice as
a linguistic construction that focuses on the object of the
relevant action rather than the person performing the action.14
Taken together, these four cases stand for the uncontroversial
presumption that a statute written in the passive voice leaves
the identity of the relevant statutory actor indeterminate. The
Court seems neither to do much with nor to gain much from
this form of passive-voice reference. Rather, it simply notes
that the passive voice creates interpretive ambiguity.
B.

The Passive Voice and Culpability

In Dean v. United States, by contrast, the Court drew
significant inferences from the fact that the statute was
written in the passive voice. Specifically, the Court pointed to
the statute’s use of the passive voice to bolster its argument
that a firearms-enhancement provision did not require
intentional action by the defendant.15 The statute at issue
provided that any person who “uses,” “carries,” or “possesses” a
firearm while committing a violent crime is subject to a
sentencing enhancement of at least five years and at least ten
years “if the firearm is discharged.”16 Defendant Dean carried a
gun while robbing a bank; as he was collecting money from a
teller’s drawer, the gun accidentally discharged.17 The statutory
dispute was over whether the enhancement provision’s “is
discharged” language contains a requirement that the
defendant intend to discharge the firearm.18
In a 7-2 opinion, the Court held that the “is discharged”
clause does not contain an intent requirement.19 Justice
Roberts’s opinion for the Court began with a nod to the
statutory text, noting that the text “does not require that the
discharge be done knowingly or intentionally, or otherwise
contain words of limitation.”20 The opinion then launched into a
nuanced argument about the meaning of the passive voice in
criminal statutes:
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

See BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN AMERICAN USAGE 483 (1998).
See Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1853 (2009).
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006).
Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1852.
Id. at 1852-53.
Id.
Id. at 1853.
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Congress’s use of the passive voice further indicates that subsection
(iii) does not require proof of intent. The passive voice focuses on an
event that occurs without respect to a specific actor, and therefore
without respect to any actor’s intent or culpability. It is whether
something happened—not how or why it happened—that matters.21

Several interpretive moves are at work in this paragraph. First
the Court made the uncontroversial statement that the passive
voice focuses on the action that takes place rather than on its
performer. From there, the Court leapt to the conclusion that a
statute written in the passive voice is triggered any time the
action it describes occurs—without regard to the intent or
culpability of any actor, and without regard to whether any
actor actually has committed the described action.
As support for this leap, the Court wove a thread
connecting the grammatical form of the “is discharged”
language in Dean with the grammatical form of the “to be
used” language in the firearms-enhancement provision in
Watson⎯claiming that Watson established that the passive
voice in the phrase “to be used” reflects “agnosticism . . . about
who does the using.”22 This statement, of course, was a slight
recharacterization of Watson, which held merely that the
passive voice in the phrase “to be used” left unclear whether
the statute applied to a person who trades drugs for a gun.23
Thus, the Dean Court did not simply apply an established
grammar rule to a statute; it (re)defined the statutory
consequences of the legislature’s use of the passive voice based
on its own prior construction of that grammatical device.
Why did the Court bother with this less-thanstraightforward argument about the passive voice? One can
only speculate, but the Court’s passive-voice reference in Dean
appears to have accomplished two things. First, it acted as a
linguistic trump card, corroborating and lending an air of
neutrality to the Court’s reading of the statute. Second, it
promoted horizontal, landscape coherence by articulating a
conventional statutory meaning for passive-voice usage across
statutes and cases. That is, it created a sort of common-law,
judicially prescribed rule about what a statute’s use of the

21

Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id. (emphasis added).
23
Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 81 (2007) (“[T]he utility of
§ 924(d)(1) is limited by its generality and its passive voice; it tells us a gun can be
‘used’ in a receipt crime, but not whether both parties to a transfer use the gun, or only
one, or which one.”).
22
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passive voice means. Going forward, the Court’s decisions in
Dean and Watson establish a linguistic presumption that a
statute that uses the passive voice contains no intent or
culpability requirement⎯at least in the case of firearmsenhancement provisions24 and perhaps in the case of all
criminal statutes. This is so despite the fact that the passivevoice argument performed only corroborative work in Dean and
Watson; because the Court’s statements about the interpretive
consequences of the passive voice are not statute-specific,
subsequent courts will be hard-pressed to give a contrary
meaning to other criminal statutes written in the passive voice.
C.

The Passive Voice and Sentencing Factors

In Jones v. United States, Justice Kennedy’s dissenting
opinion similarly relied on a statute’s use of the passive voice to
draw definitive inferences about the statute’s meaning.25 Jones
involved the construction of the federal carjacking statute, 18
U.S.C. § 2119, which reads as follows:
Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of this title,
takes a motor vehicle . . . from the person or presence of another by
force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall—
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both,
(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title)
results, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25
years, or both, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any
number of years up to life, or both.26

Defendant Jones had participated in a carjacking with two
other men.27 While Jones and one of the other men held up the
victims, the third man stuck his gun in one of the victims’ ears
and later struck that victim on the head, causing serious
injury.28 The issue was whether the statute’s numbered
24

See, e.g., United States v. Lora-Pena, 375 F. App’x 242, 246-47 (3d Cir.
2010) (citing Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1853, to conclude that a Sentencing Guideline
requiring “a five-level increase in offense level if ‘a firearm was discharged’ . . . does not
distinguish between accidental and purposeful discharges, and does not require a
finding that defendant pulled the trigger”).
25
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 259 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
26
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1988) (amended 1994 & 1996).
27
Jones, 526 U.S. at 229-31.
28
Id.
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subclauses were sentencing provisions—specifying escalating
punishments for the offense set forth in the first paragraph—or
whether they instead constituted three separate offenses.29
In a 5-4 opinion, the Court concluded that “the fairest
reading” of the statute was to treat the serious-bodily-harm
provision as an element of a separate offense rather than as a
mere sentencing enhancement.30 Justice Kennedy, joined by
three other dissenters, disagreed. The dissenting opinion relied
significantly on the structure of the statute31 but also
emphasized the statute’s use of the passive voice:
[T]here is some significance in the use of the active voice in the main
paragraph and the passive voice in clauses (2) and (3) of § 2119. In
the more common practice, criminal statutes use the active voice to
define prohibited conduct. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1116 (1994 ed., Supp.
III) (“[w]hoever kills or attempts to kill”); § 2114 (“assaults,” “robs or
attempts to rob,” “receives, possesses, conceals, or disposes”); Tex.
Penal Code Ann. §§ 29.03(a)(1), (2) (1994) (aggravated robbery;
“causes serious bodily injury,” or “uses or exhibits a deadly weapon”);
cf. 18 U.S.C. § 248(b) (setting forth, as sentencing factors, “if bodily
injury results,” and “if death results”); United States Sentencing
Commission, Guidelines Manual § 2B3.1(b)(3) (Nov. 1998) (robbery
guideline; “[i]f any victim sustained bodily injury”).32

Again, several interpretive moves are at work in this grammarbased argument. First, the dissent made the authoritative
linguistic-drafting-convention statement that “[i]n the more
common practice, criminal statutes use the active voice to
define prohibited conduct.”33 It then referenced several federal
statutes, a state statute, and the United States Sentencing
Commission Guidelines Manual to establish this drafting
convention.34 The dissent’s passive-voice argument thus
involved very little linguistic analysis and quite a lot of judicial
synthesis, or landscape coherence-construction. As far as one
29

Id. at 230-32. The distinction was crucial because the indictment had not
charged any of the facts relating to bodily injury, and the jury instructions had defined
the elements of the government’s burden of proof with reference only to the first
paragraph of the statute. If the second and third subclauses were deemed to be
sentencing provisions, this would not matter, and Jones could be sentenced to twenty-five
years based on the serious bodily injury caused to one of the victims. If, however, the
subclauses were read as separate offense provisions containing new elements, then the
government’s failure to plead these elements in the indictment and prove them before the
jury would preclude it from seeking the twenty-five-year penalty against Jones.
30
Id. at 239.
31
Id. at 256 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
32
Id. at 258-59.
33
Id. at 258 (emphasis added).
34
Id. at 258-59.
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can tell, there was no established rule⎯linguistic, legislative,
judicial, or otherwise⎯behind the dissent’s pronouncement.
The dissenters seem to have constructed this drafting
convention out of their own assessment of the other criminal
statutes and guidelines they discovered in the surrounding
legal landscape.
Again, the lingering legisprudential question is, why
bother? And again, the answer appears to be twofold:
legitimation and horizontal coherence. Although the passivevoice drafting convention announced by the dissent was not
necessary to its construction of the statute, the grammar-based
argument lent an element of detached tie-breaking to that
construction. Faced with the close question of whether to treat
§ 2119’s clauses as sentencing enhancements or elements of the
offense, the grammar reference cloaked the dissent’s
interpretation with the imprimatur of neutrality⎯presenting it
as the product of drafting custom rather than ideological
sympathies or a desire to reach a particular result. This is
Larry Solan’s theory in action. But there is more than
legitimation going on here, particularly since the dissent
undermined the force of its drafting-convention argument by
acknowledging, in the following paragraph, that the passiveversus-active-voice distinctions “are not absolute rules.”35
In addition, the dissent’s passive-voice argument also
harmonized (or attempted to harmonize) meaning across
criminal statutes. Like the Court’s opinion in Dean, the Jones
dissent did not merely apply grammar rules to the carjacking
statute as set forth in a grammar handbook. Instead, it used
the statute’s grammatical structure as a means for threading
various parts of the statutory framework together into a
coherent whole.36 This brought coherence to the legal landscape
in two ways. First, it established a presumption (and pattern)
across existing criminal statutes that the active voice describes
elements of an offense while the passive voice reflects
sentencing factors.37 Second, it announced a drafting
35

Id. at 259.
See id. at 258-59; see also Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1853
(2009) (citing comments in Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 81 (2007), regarding
the meaning associated with a statute’s use of the passive voice).
37
Of course, as a practical matter, this presumption has limited force since it
appeared in the dissent rather than the majority opinion. But I would not be surprised if
it is invoked in the future: the Jones majority opinion relied heavily on the constitutional
avoidance doctrine to reject reading the statute’s subclauses as additional sentencing
factors that the prosecution was not required to plead or prove. Jones, 526 U.S. at 239-40.
36
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convention, going forward, about the interpretive consequences
of composing criminal statutes in the passive, as opposed to the
active, voice.
The Jones dissent illustrates that judges are drawn to
grammar-based—or at least passive-voice-based—arguments
even when those arguments are neither necessary to the
statute’s construction nor particularly definitive. Part of the
reason for this appeal is the false aura of detached decision
making associated with linguistic analysis. But part of the
appeal also lies in the fact that linguistic analysis provides a
natural tool through which judges can impose external
coherence across statutes, and can reason from statute to
statute and from case to case.
II.

GRAMMAR REFERENCES AND HORIZONTAL COHERENCE

This legitimation-plus-harmonization use of grammatical
analysis is similar to the two-in-one approach that the Court
uses when invoking the whole-act rule38 or its own prior
interpretation of a particular word to interpret a statute.39 On
the one hand, when the Court relies on the whole-act rule or its
own prior interpretations, it engages in a sort of legal fiction,
Perhaps the Jones dissent’s presumption will resurface in a case that distinguishes the
Jones majority’s contrary construction on constitutional grounds.
38
The whole-act rule presumes internal statutory coherence—that the
legislature drafts each statute as a structurally consistent document, both “in its use of
language and in the way [the statute’s] provisions work together.” See WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 862 (4th ed. 2007).
Consistent with this underlying assumption, the whole-act rule instructs courts to
interpret statutory provisions in a way that does not render the statute’s other
provisions redundant or superfluous, and presumes that identical words used in
different parts of the same statute have the same meaning. The rule also counsels that
when the legislature includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits
it in another, it acts deliberately and intends different meanings by the disparate
wording. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (disparate
wording); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (presumption of consistent
meaning for identical words); Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988)
(presumption against redundancy).
39
The Court presumes that Congress legislates against the backdrop of prior
judicial interpretations of other statutes. Through this presumption, the Court justifies
its reference to its own prior interpretations when giving meaning to similar words or
phrases in a new statute. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and
Laws, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 16-17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“Another accepted rule of construction is that
ambiguities in a newly enacted statute are to be resolved in such fashion as to make
the statute, not only internally consistent, but also compatible with previously enacted
laws. We simply assume, for purposes of our search for ‘intent,’ that the enacting
legislature was aware of all those other laws. . . . [O]f course that is a fiction . . . .”).
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presuming that the construction it has chosen likely is the one
Congress intended because it makes the most sense given the
statute’s structure or the judiciary’s prior interpretation of a
word. On the other hand, the Court is also saying that even if it
sets aside the legal fiction that Congress is internally consistent
and deliberate in structuring a statute or that Congress
legislates with an awareness of the Court’s previous
interpretations of particular words, it nevertheless is
appropriate to employ the whole-act rule and its own prior
interpretations to construe statutes because these interpretive
rules help make sense of the overarching, interconnected legal
landscape of which the statute is a part. In other words,
irrespective of what we know about how Congress behaves when
drafting statutes, the Court considers it part of its role as
interpreter to bring coherence to the law and to harmonize
various legal rules into a sensible whole—much as it would
synthesize common-law precedents if it were working with
common-law rules rather than with statutes. The same thing is
happening, I think, with the Court’s passive-voice references. In
Jones, the dissenting opinion both (1) engaged in the legal fiction
that Congress deliberately uses the passive voice to articulate
sentencing factors and the active voice to articulate offense
elements; and (2) at the same time, announced that even if
Congress did not deliberately employ this passive-versus-activevoice distinction, the distinction is a good one—providing a
drafting rule that makes sense of the existing legal framework—
and thus should be applied in construing the statute at issue.
The same legal fiction plus drafting-convention announcement
were at work in the Court’s opinion in Dean.
In my view, then, the Court’s passive-voice-based
grammar arguments are a little less corroborative and a little
more constructive than they might appear at first glance. That
is, the Court references a statute’s grammatical structure not
because it is convinced that that grammatical structure reveals
Congress’s true intent or that Congress focused on the particular
meaning conveyed by its grammatical choices when drafting the
statute. In other words, I do not think that the Court uses
grammar references to lead it to—or to check itself against—
Congress’s actual intent. Rather, in citing the statute’s use of the
passive voice, Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Jones seems to be
saying that, because its statutory reading is consistent with the
way Congress and state legislatures have drafted other criminal
statutes, its construction should be preferred—irrespective of
whether Congress deliberately intended that construction when
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it chose to use the passive voice. The Court’s passive-voice
argument in Dean is to similar effect: the Court seems to be
stating that because its construction of the “is discharged”
provision is consistent with its own prior construction of other
statutory provisions using the passive voice, this construction is
the correct one—regardless of whether Congress was aware of,
or agreed with, the prior interpretation. The Court’s passivevoice references, then, are about promoting continuity, external
consistency, and drafting rules that Congress will have to follow
in the future or will be presumed to have followed in the
future—almost as if the Court were creating a judicial code of
grammatical meaning.
Finally, it is worth noting that this “aggressive” use of
the passive voice—aggressive both in the sense that the Court
is assigning particular meanings to a statute’s use of the
passive voice and in the sense that the Court is using the
passive voice to formulate a drafting convention that cuts
across statutes—seems to be a relatively recent development in
the Court’s jurisprudence. The Jones case was decided in 1999,
and Dean was decided in 2009. As explained in Part I, in its
earlier cases, the Court confined its passive-voice references to
the unassuming recognition that a statute written in the
passive voice left unclear the identity of the relevant statutory
actor. Only recently has the Court sought to give more
interpretive weight to a statute’s use of the passive voice, let
alone to announce a particular, consistent meaning to be
associated with the passive voice across statutes.
CONCLUSION
This essay seeks to shed new light on the role that
grammar-based linguistic arguments play in the Supreme
Court’s statutory cases, in partial answer to the question posed
by this symposium, How much work—and what kind—does
language do in statutory interpretation? Using the Court’s
passive-voice-based linguistic arguments as a case study,40 the
40

Although this article focuses on the Court’s passive-voice references, a
similar coherence-driven approach using the adjective “any” appears to exist across
statutes. See Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2243 (2009) (“The term ‘any’
ensures that the definition has a wide reach . . . .” (citing Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
552 U.S. 214, 219 (2008))); Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S. Ct. 2183, 2189 (2009)
(“[T]he word ‘any’ . . . has an ‘expansive meaning.’” (quoting United States v. Gonzales,
520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997))); United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 7
(2008) (“Five ‘any’s’ in one sentence and it begins to seem that Congress meant the
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essay suggests that grammar references perform two
significant roles in the Court’s construction of statutes. First,
as Larry Solan has previously observed, grammar arguments
seem to lend an imprimatur of neutrality to the Court’s
interpretations. Second, like the whole-act-rule presumption
about consistent meaning within a single statute and the
Court’s reliance on its own prior constructions of similar words,
grammar-based arguments provide the Court with a toolset for
constructing consistent meaning across the federal code.
Grammatical analysis thus appears to play an important role
in constructing conventional statutory meaning as much as in
corroborating it.

statute to have expansive reach.”); LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248,
261 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that “any” is indiscriminate and
provisions applying to “any losses” mean “all” losses are included (citing Ali, 552 U.S.
at 219)); Ali, 552 U.S. at 219 (“Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive
meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” (quoting Gonzales,
520 U.S. at 5)); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528-29 (2007) (holding that “any”
in statutory text “embraces all airborne compounds of whatever stripe”); Lopez v.
Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 61-62 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he word ‘any’ . . . has
an ‘expansive meaning.’” (quoting Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 5)); Small v. United States, 544
U.S. 385, 397 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that “any court” is a “broad
phrase”). So the Court’s use of linguistic analysis to foster coherence does not appear
limited to the passive-voice grammatical device.

